

THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
PHILOLOGY.¹

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Professor Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie* has accomplished a third of the program which is marked out in his discussion of this discipline, in the fourth volume of the *Studien*, and second part of the second volume of the *Logik*.

Wundt presupposes a *Volksseele*, whose reality is assured in the same fashion as that in which we assure ourselves of the reality of the individual mind. In a word, we find phenomena of experience whose relations and organization depend not upon individual mind but upon the social constructs given in the environment of the community to which we belong. "The mental products which arise through the common life of the members of a community, are not less elements of reality than the psychical processes within a single consciousness. They are of course nothing that could occur outside of individual mind. But as it is not the psychical elements in their isolated condition but their combinations and the products that spring from them which we call an individual mind, so the *Volksseele*, in empirical sense, does not consist of a bare sum of the units of individual experience, whose contents make up its content. In the case of the *Volksseele* as well, there result from the union of these units peculiar psychical and psycho-physical processes, which either could not arise at all in the consciousness of an individual

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or at least not in the completeness with which they develop through the interaction of individuals."¹ The implication of this is not that the *Volksseele* is a construction which arises as a result of scientific investigation and generalization, but that it has the same sort of existence in our thought as the individual mind, in so far as we think the peculiar processes for the presentation of which such a concept is necessary.

There are two characteristics of language, myth, and custom which distinguished them as a psychological field from the phenomena of individual consciousness. These are their independence of the life period of the individual, and the evolution which characterizes them and which extends as a process through generations. In so far then as we speak of language as developing from generation to generation, and still conceive of it as an expression of native impulse, gradually built up by assimilations, and complications, and fusions, and associations, and controlled by apperceptive processes, in other words describe it as a psychological phenomenon, we are recognizing what Wundt insists upon. We are postulating an empirical community-mind within which such processes take place whose boundaries are not those of the individuals who make up the group, but those of the community.

The point of view which Wundt criticizes, and which has been the customary one of the philologist whose psychology has been of the Herbartian School, looks upon language in so far as it is phenomenon of community-life as belonging to the domain of the historical and objective comparative sciences. Psychology has jurisdiction only in so far as speech is regarded as the act of the individual *qua* individual. A comparative physiology which explained and defined language-changes as sounds, and a comparative grammar which presented these changes and explained them as forms of speech, would be the sciences of language. Psychology would be an applied science which would give extensive assistance both from the point of view of sound — physiological psychology — and from the point of view of forms — the explanation of changes of meaning, of inflections, etc. But the changes which an individual psychology could

¹ *Völkerpsy.*, Vol. I., pp. 9 and 10.

give would be confined to the consciousness of the individual. The explanations would account only for the change as an experience of the individual. In so far as this experience becomes a fact of physical science as sound, or of philological science as speech, it would be subject to universal laws transcending the existence of the individual. In this sense language would not belong to the field of psychology, but psychology would be brought in to account for particular forms and incidental changes, while the laws of language would be those that followed the uniformities of change in words and speech viewed as the subjects of an objective science. In a similar manner one could present a psychological picture of the occurrence of a crime, while a statistical science would simply deal with it as an objective fact, or a sociological inquiry would deal with the general conditions under which it took place, perhaps making use of the psychological treatment for clues and comprehension, but translating all into terms of the objective science before the subject matter was in form for the treatment of sociology. But the best illustration is from history. Psychological interpretation is an essential part of an historical presentation, but history aims to identify and present the reality of an event or series of events. They are presented as events, not as psychological laws. Psychological laws come in to aid in the full understanding of the event, but not as the subject matter which history presents. From these events various laws may conceivably be generalized, but these laws would not be psychological laws. From such a point of view it has been the custom, and to a large degree remains the custom, to regard language. It is an objective fact like the events of history, and the laws of language are objective laws in the same sense that the generalizations of history are conceived of as objective laws. A consistent Herbartian, such as the philologist Paul, recognizes no psychological phenomenon which is not one of an individual soul. Language is not an affair of the individual soul, and its laws are frequently generalizations which would not have the slightest meaning if read into terms of the experience of the individual soul. The mechanism of the individual soul may be that which is responsible for the changes and the growth and

development of language, but the product lies outside of the experience of the souls whose mechanisms are responsible for it.

The same questions arise with reference to myth and custom. Myth represents the ideas of a people or group of peoples, when these ideas are the expression of the impulses of the community and when they are the carriers of the emotional content of the community life. Custom (*Sitte*) is community-direction of conduct, the impulse under the control of tradition and public opinion. Out of the first spring religion and art and out of the other arise the institutions of law and government. As contents of idea and emotion and voluntary control they are subject matter for psychology. But the contents they represent far transcend the limits of the individual experience. Indeed they are so vast and overwhelming in their force and mass that they receive the individual only as the ocean receives the drop of water, though the ocean is nothing but drops of water.

Lazarus and Steinthal in the opening pages of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, though Herbartians, abandoned the consistent position of Paul and maintained that psychology deals not with the *Seele* but with the *Geist*; that while the *Seele* is a metaphysical entity the *Geist* is only the actual presentation of experience, and may be considered apart from a metaphysical doctrine of the soul. Such a presentation, as we have already seen, makes the basis for the empirical self and makes as possible a social self — the *Volksseele*. But while their position in this regard is identical with that of Wundt, their program of a Folkpsychology is radically different. If they abandoned an Herbartian *Seele* they did not give up the Herbartian *Vorstellungsmechanik*. This mechanism allows only for the play of ideas, acting and reacting upon each other, exactly as physics conceives of its elements interacting among themselves. In either of these systems there is no place for a change of content in the elements themselves. The ultimate objects remain the same, and in so far as psychology deals with these and reduces all mental processes and contents to these ideas and their interplay there can be no such thing as a development revealed by psychological analysis. For an evolution Herbartianism has no account, except in so far as this

arises through the interaction of the environment and the masses of ideas. It must be something external to the ideas themselves. In particular such an evolution as language cannot exist as a psychological datum. In the same manner we may say that a physics that dealt only with molecules would necessarily reduce the structures which arise in an evolutionary process back to these molecules. For such a physics evolution would not exist. Its business would be to analyze all objects, which might be presented to it, into elements which have presumably remained unchanged through the whole process of so-called development.

It is evident that in so far as Lazarus and Steinthal are consistent in the application of their doctrine, they could never present such growths as language, myth, and custom as psychological contents, but would be confined in their psychological treatment of them to analyzing out the psychological elements and determining the psychological laws which had contributed to their appearance. Wundt, on the other hand, recognizing that the changes which take place in subjective experience are qualitative, that no one state can ever be reduced to antecedent elements, is in a position to recognize development as a psychological phenomenon and therefore may conceivably present language in all its changes as a psychological datum.

The differences between the Herbartian treatment of a language and Wundt's is, however, not confined to the nature of the subject-matter itself. The distinction is that with which we are familiar under the terms intellectualistic and voluntaristic. It is the advantage of this latter type of psychology that it is able to start with an act in the form of an impulse. The striking illustration of this advantage is to be found in the theories of the origin of language. From the standpoint of an associational psychology — one that recognizes only ideas and their connections, or at least depends upon these for the psychological analysis of the contents of consciousness — language is almost unavoidably conceived of as an invention. While the more modern psychologist would not be guilty of the absurd theories of the origin of language, of religion, or of government which belong to the rationalism of the eighteenth century, a thorough-

going associational psychology, whether Herbartian or English, can give no account of language processes which in principle differs from these. For typical associations lie between contents of consciousness which have been analyzed out of objects and have become symbolic. The sensuous content and its meaning have been separated from each other and in so far the content is arbitrary. Our theories of association are perhaps more readily illustrated by a Volapük than by a natural language. Wundt, on the other hand, is able to refer the beginning of language to the primitive impulse to expression. The sound is at first but a gesture (*Lautgeberde*). Articulation, as a muscular process, is explained in the same way that movements of the face, of the hands, of the whole body are accounted for under the influence of emotional tension. Instead, therefore, of having to assume unknown or exceptional conditions as the antecedents of the origin of speech, we can find the conditions present in our own movements, in the first activities of children, in the gesture languages of primitive peoples or the deaf-mutes.

The advantage of this point of view is further evident in the recognition that the elements with which psychology deals are not objects — psychological atoms — but events. Among these events can be placed states which are predominantly affective, or motor in their character, and the intellectual content recognized as a development. As an illustration of the advantage of the voluntaristic attitude, Wundt's discussion of what the psychical processes are out of which the external activities in gesture language arise, and of the relation between the universal psychological laws and the individual motives that influence the expression, may be profitably presented. "The foundation on which the answer to the question must be built, and from which the psychological analysis must start, is the origin of all signs in natural gesture-language, in movements of expression. This fundamental law leads necessarily to the assumption that the primary cause of a natural gesture is not the motive of conveying an idea, but is that of the expression of an emotional activity. The gesture is first of all and originally an affective expression. However necessary it is for a language of gesture that it should raise itself above this stage, it remains true that it

would never have arisen without the original emotional impulse. Only secondarily, in so far as every affective state contains ideas charged with emotion, does the gesture become an expression of an idea. In the further psychical effects which are connected with this subsidiary phase of the expression of emotion lies the cause for the entire further development into a gesture language. It is, above all, as conveyor of ideas that the expressive movement of one calls out the like affective states in others, because only through the passage of consonant ideas from the one to the other can the actual agreement of their emotions take place. Expressions of feeling are able to give and recreate only the like fundamental direction of emotional change. The affective state itself as well as its reappearance in others gains a definite content only through the content of ideas and the movements in which these announce themselves to the outer world. Another effect of the expression of ideas goes hand in hand with the more exact reproduction of the affective state. In so far as this has given a further substratum to the reproduction of the emotional experience that has arisen in another, it arouses further ideas, that are related to those conveyed through the gestures, reinforce them, or, on the other hand, if they arouse contradictory emotions, enter into opposition to them. At this point the gesture of the other is not a mere reflex of the movement of the first; on the contrary, out of the sympathetic movement has grown an *answering* movement. If at first the boundaries between these flow into each other, gradually they must distinguish themselves more and more as the movement of ideas in individual consciousness becomes more active. If the answer was at first little more than a reproduction of the same ideal content, in the further course the reproduction of that which is perceived retreats behind the newly aroused ideas. In this fashion finally the individual emotional state, under the influence of the backward and forward interchange of gestures, has passed into a common affective experience. As, through this pronounced emphasis on the contents of ideas, the affective elements and thus the emotions themselves are moderated, the common emotional experience with the backward and forward interchange of gestures passes

into a common thought process, taking place through the exchange of gesture expression."¹

Such a conception of the beginning of gesture language passes over easily to that of the beginning of spoken language, through the recognition that articulate sounds are in their beginning but sound-gestures and take the same place in the act of emotional expression that is taken by the gesture. Perhaps there is no better illustration of the importance of psychology to the comprehension of language than such a natural and simple presentation of the beginning of the interchange of ideas through the simple sympathetic interaction of gesture expression within a common emotional situation. There could be no better illustration of the advantage of beginning one's psychological analysis with the act in its primitive form of the impulse, instead of being forced to build it up out of intellectual elements.

The illustration is also of importance in throwing light on the difference of attitude of Wundt and Delbrück. Delbrück has published under the title of *Grundfragen der Sprachforschung*, a criticism of Wundt's two-volume work. The criticism is on the whole sympathetic. When an eminent philologist treats with so much consideration a psychologist who has written a considerable treatise on the philologist's own subject from the psychologist's point of view, it is evident that to some degree it must be true that language is the field of psychology. But in just this point Delbrück is not in full agreement with the psychologist. He epitomizes the two, Wundt's voluntaristic, and the Herbartian intellectualistic psychology, and informs his fellow philologists that they will find that in the main one system works practically as well as the other. He recognizes the decided advantages to which reference has been made above of the more modern psychology, recognizes in fact several points in which it is able to attack problems which the older type of psychology could not undertake. But to a large degree he insists that either theory works as well as the other. Wundt has not been willing to let this attitude of Delbrück go unchallenged, and in a brochure entitled *Sprachgeschichte der Sprachpsychologie* has replied to this and other positions of his critic. He is

¹ *Völkerpsychologie*, Vol. I., pp. 239-40.

particularly sensitive to this assumption of Delbrück's that one brand of psychology is as serviceable as the other. Even if he were willing to waive this point he insists that it is at the bottom not a question of serviceability but of truth, and that with the same measure the philologist measures withal it should be measured to him again. Would he be willing to waive the question of the truth of philological theory and consider only its serviceability for the purposes of some particular presentation? At bottom the question is that which I have tried to make evident, in the contrast between the Wundtian and Herbartian psychologies. The Herbartian psychology cannot, in so far as it is consistent in theory or mechanism, pretend to be anything more than an applied science within the field of philology. Its serviceability from this point of view is bound to be the criterion by which it is judged. The situation is a very different one when the psychologist maintains that language is the field of psychology. He is not called in in this case to render services which are determined by another and judged by another as to their success. He is within his own field, and is his own judge.

The illustration which has just been given is a good one of just this change in the relative positions of the sciences, if Wundt is correct. The question of the beginnings of language is not attacked from the standpoint of the comparative philologist. There is no generalization from the earliest forms of speech with which we are familiar, nor are there any inferences drawn from the *Ursprachen* which can be constructed out of the identities between kindred tongues. The problem is attacked as a psychological problem. Speech is an act and like any other act has its natural history which psychology can undertake to give to us from a study of its nature and its analogy to other acts. It is, in its primitive form, emotional expression, not because primitive languages are more emotional, but because gestures and cries are the external parts of emotional acts. Sympathetic reproduction of seen gestures, and the change in them which answers to the difference of conscious content they arouse are facts with which psychology deals, and out of these facts arises a theory of the origin of language which whether it is correct or not is psychological, and not philological in the ordinary sense of the word.

The philologist has not been successful enough in his efforts to reconstruct a primitive language, to care to contest with the psychologist his right to form theories within his own field. He probably feels that language in its beginnings was a very individual affair. But when it has become an inflected language, a language with a history that is written in external characters and handed down by literatures and grammarians, the assertion that it lies within the field of psychology is a different matter, and here the philologist still considers the psychologist as a serviceable assistant, not as one who may speak by his own right. The question reduces itself very largely to this: How far can the distinction between philology as a historical science and Folkpsychology as a science of principles be carried out? With the determination of the appearance of forms, their specific outward character, and the varied influences from time to time of external influences psychology has nothing to do. But the moment that language is presented as mental process, and one attempts to explain its changes through its use, through the interchange of expression ideal and emotional, through the structure of the sentence, in other words through the outward form of the judgment, the investigation has become a psychological affair, the material with which the philologist deals is psychological material. But even this statement is not unambiguous. As the language exists in the consciousness of the individual it must of course be recognized as psychological material, but the great phenomena of language are not those that appear in the consciousness of individuals. As already indicated they exist for us in the comparison of different languages or dialects, in shifts that lie far beyond the conscious discrimination of those that are subject to them, etc. If these are psychological phenomena they are such in a different sense from that of individual psychology. They must be the phenomena of the Folk-mind. The legitimacy of this conception has already been discussed, the question now is as to serviceability and the effects of its use in the study of language.

The equivocal relation between philosophy and philology is not a new situation. A century ago the place now taken by psychology was usurped by metaphysics. It was the logical

relations and the metaphysical assumptions based upon these logical relations which were felt to underlie the theory of language. The offspring of this marriage between the two disciplines were not promising, and the connection between the sciences has been severed. The substitution of psychology for metaphysics and logic has been a gradual one. The philologists have not consciously elected to have recourse to psychology. They have found themselves within its borders. Their psychology has been frequently, and unfortunately continues still largely to be, of the popular kind—of the kind which assumes that because a change has taken place and brought with it a different use, this use was determined upon by conscious agents, especially when the change seems to have advantages connected with it. Finally, the Herbartians have become through Steinthal and Paul conscious of the dependence of philology upon psychology and have attempted to set out what these relations are. But the work of the great comparative philologists of recent years has been fundamentally psychological, and is becoming increasingly so. The importance of Wundt's work is that he has thought the thing through consistently and has attempted to define and lay out this territory which has become psychological even without the intentions of the investigators themselves.

On the other hand he is called upon to justify his pretensions by his own success in dealing with the problems. I think there can be no question that he has succeeded in locating the question of the origin of language within the field of psychology. As further evidence of this, may be presented the discussion of the relation of the beginnings of language to song and work. Bücher¹ has brought back song to the rhythms of work as its origin. Jespersen maintains that man is a singing animal by nature and connects the primitive outbursts of song with emotional states of love and joy.² The question is at bottom one of the most primitive rhythms in human consciousness, and when Delbrück, who follows Jespersen, while Wundt follows Bücher, says³ that it is not improbable that in the end the ultimate

¹ *Arbeit und Rhythmus*.

² Jespersen, *Progress in Language*.

³ *Grundfragen d. Sprachforschung*, p. 92.

ground for rhythm is to be sought in the varying compass of our consciousness and in the fluctuations of our attention, it is evident that this problem is unquestionably a psychological one.

If we turn now to changes of sounds in words (*Lautwandel*), we find ourselves in the field of acknowledged psychological processes — those of association. It is true that certain scientists have tried to account for these changes through differences of climate and physical environment, acting directly or indirectly on the organs of speech. The complete impossibility of determining any physiological or anatomical differences answering to differences of articulation and pronunciation has led to the abandonment of these explanations and left philologists with causes which in the end must be considered as psychological. This is evident in the substitution for a theory of inheritance of organs and processes, of a theory of 'training' (*Einübungstheorie*), in accordance with which each generation fails adequately to reproduce what it hears and thus introduces unceasing change. This is, however, much too general a theory to answer to the many specific changes that have to be accounted for. Grimm's law for the changes of mutes is an excellent illustration of an orderly procedure in sound-change which remains without any satisfactory explanation. Wundt here has attempted one, based on the assumption that speech has become increasingly more rapid during the periods within which these changes have taken place, and upon investigations of an experimental nature as to the effects of increased tempo in speech. He is of the opinion that the greater rapidity in speaking is an adequate explanation. Unfortunately the philologists not only dispute the adequacy of the hypothesis, but also his facts.¹ But while this hypothesis is presumably untenable, its rejection does not render the problem any the less psychological. If the question is ever answered it will be by the psycho-physical psychologist. Wundt's failure in this case simply emphasizes this.

The treatment of changes by assimilations and dissimilations, whether in letters immediately in contact or at a distance from each other, is confessedly due to the predominance in conscious-

¹ Delbrück, *Grundfragen*, 102 ff.

ness of a sound which merges with another and leads to the changes in question. *E. g.*, the change from *adsimilare* to *assimilare*, *supmus* to *summus*, turtle from *turtur*, purple from *purpur*. In the analogical changes we find influences extending from one word or group of words to another. *E. g.*, the introduction of *t* into the original word *egoism* after the fashion of despotism, etc., the change of Ger. *sturben* to *starben* after the analogy *starb*. The treatment of all these phenomena belongs to the psychology of fusion, assimilation and association. It is worth while to refer in passing to the advantage to the doctrine of composite words which has accrued through Wundt's carrying the process back to the organization of ideas that lie behind the words.

It would occupy too much space to extend this catalogue through the theory of inflection and the syntax that goes with it. The more complex and specific the expression of relations becomes in the forms of words and their structure in sentences, the more evident becomes the essentially psychological character of the material with which the philologist is dealing.

The most interesting consideration arising out of the two brochures to which I have referred, Delbrück's criticism and Wundt's reply, is to be found in the difference of attitude of the two scientists. We may mention first of all a freedom in dealing with other tongues beside the Indo-European and Semitic groups on the part of the psychologist which is evidently surprising and somewhat displeasing to the philologist. Delbrück withholds himself from criticism, affirming that his own department lies within the Indo-European field. He does, however, suggest that until our knowledge of the languages of other and especially primitive peoples is fuller, especially with reference to their history, deductions drawn from them must be received with scepticism. It is impossible for the reviewer to enter into the question of fact. What is of interest is that Wundt feels himself to have a point of view which justifies him in using material which the philologist who is unquestionably linguistically better prepared than the psychologist is unwilling to use. Wundt shows that he has at least the courage of his convictions. Just as in the question of the origin of language the psychologi-

cal treatment enables the philologist to dispense with a reconstruction based on historical remains and inferences drawn from these, so psychological equipment should enable the philologist to make valuable use of tongues whose history may be out of the reach of science. One of the principal uses which Wundt makes of the extra-Indo-European and Semitic tongues is in the discussion of the development of the sentence. We find among these the attributive sentence, which to his mind comes before the predicative sentence. He connects this naturally with the phenomena of parataxis in the classical groups and the evidence that a paratactical construction has preceded the hypotactical. The psychological interest in the question gathers around the development of the logically organized sentence out of one that is based upon simple processes of association. It should be added that Wundt uses logical here in the psychological sense, that it answers to apperceptive or to the consciousness of relations which comes with the constructive, *i. e.*, apperceptive process. It is a psychological interpretation of the history of the copula and the form of sentence that depends upon it. Without discussing then Wundt's technical competence in this particular philological field, there can be no doubt that psychological competence on the part of a philologist would put at his disposal material which lack of historical data leaves largely barren at present. We have already referred to the psycho-physical hypothesis suggested by Wundt as an explanation for Grimm's law, and have pointed out that its present presumable insufficiency does not detract from its interest as an indication of the essentially psychological nature of this philological question.

Connected with the question of the origin of language is the theory of roots. Older doctrine in philology maintained that there were three periods in the history of language; a period of roots, of agglutinated roots, and a resulting period of inflection, which was not only the last but the most perfect. Of course a language of roots cannot be found, but it was assumed that in the Chinese we had a language which is made up simply of roots stuck together. If we could get so near to the original root period it was but a short leap to that primitive

situation. Later investigation of the Chinese has shown that it is in all probability a development out of an inflected language, that it answers in the theory of language development more nearly to the English in its wearing away of inflections, or rather that the same process of attrition and consequent reconstruction which distinguishes the English, not only from the classical tongues but also from the German, has been carried much farther in the Chinese (v. Jespersen, *Progress in Language*). Furthermore, comparative study of the roots themselves in highly inflected tongues has shown that they are not the original elements, at least in a large number of cases, that the term root must be taken as the element which is left behind when the inflected endings are abstracted and on the logical side as that part of the word of the Indo-European original speech which those who spoke it felt as the center of meaning (*Bedeutungscentrum*).¹ This assumption of what may be called a functional root is still in favor with the philologists. Delbrück still assumes that roots are original elements which can even be conceived of as existing in their naked form in a primitive language. That is, he wishes to regard it not simply as a functional and hence psychological entity, but also as a historical entity. Delbrück attempts such a historical reconstruction, following Jespersen's conception of the primitive speech as a continuum of sound, in which the unit was as yet an undifferentiated sentence, not a word. He sees no reason why the differentiation of the parts of this continuum may not have been roots rather than inflected words. To this Wundt opposes the facts of daily life, the unquestioned appearance of new words which have no preceding history as roots. He opposes furthermore the psychological fact that "the elements of words are in the nature of the case only elements of given word-ideas (*Wortvorstellungen*); the question how the word has arisen remains untouched by them."²

Wundt's definition of the sentence is as follows: "A sentence is the spoken expression for the voluntary organization (*Gliederung*) of an entire idea (*Gesammtvorstellung*) by its parts placed

¹ *Grundfragen*, p. 120.

² *Völkerpsy.*, Vol. I., p. 559.

in their logical relations."¹ It should be noted that Wundt uses the word logical in its psychological sense, *i. e.*, in the sense of the actual relations subjectively felt in the expression; and that he recognizes two sets of psychical forces at work in the formation of the sentence, the primary associations which in some sense provide the material, and the apperceptive process which is responsible for the organization of the entire idea. These two sets working over against each other are responsible for the determination of the different parts of the sentence, for the original appearance of the words as parts of the sentence, and for the selection of words in developed language. Delbrück is pleased with this conception of the sentence in general, but opposes to it the instances of the vocative and the interjections. These, not to consider the imperative, present expressions in language which are not articulated and which yet must be conceived of from the point of view of expressions (*Äusserungen*) and are not therefore to be genetically distinguished from sentences. The reply is simple enough, that the bare emotional outcry — or the interjection — is not a sentence nor an expression which can be classed as a sentence; that on the other hand where the vocative or the so-called interjection carries a meaning with it there is always an articulation of ideas though there be but a single word outwardly expressed. I have instanced this because it shows that even in the less crucial questions the psychological attitude gives a freedom which the philologist profits by, or may profit by.

Delbrück in closing his criticism undertakes to commend Wundt's psychology to his fellow philologists, by assuring them that it offers a mechanism which is not essentially different from that of the Herbartians, at least in respect to background of the unconscious and the structure of the ideas; Wundt's substitution of the psychical disposition for the interrelated masses of ideas which are pushing themselves above the threshold of consciousness in the Herbartian psychology, for practical purposes, seems to be but the calling of the same thing by another name. Whether the idea lies in the background of consciousness or is below the threshold makes no essential difference in the application.

¹ *Ibid.*, V. II., p. 240.

This does not of course hold for the Wundtian conception of association. This confines association to the connection of ideas as a whole and excludes the processes of assimilation, complication, and fusion. Just these latter processes are those that are most in evidence in the formation of words and their changes, and the proper conception of them tends to correct the tendency to give an unwarranted influence to conscious intention in word changes. But the schemata of apprehension—the anticipation of the sentence-form that is given by a single word, the recognition of a relation and what it involves in the mood of a verb or the case of a noun—these phenomena of perception can perhaps be as readily managed from the one point of view as the other. Perhaps this fact is an indication that the psychological treatment of this structural side of consciousness has not reached a final form. The sharp distinction that Wundt, and not he alone among psychologists, is forced to make between this presented structural material and the apperceptive or attentive processes is by no means an ultimate presentation. In a word, we have here two methods of presentation, a structural treatment, that of the associative and allied processes, which is most readily stated in terms of the nervous system; and a functional statement, that of attention and apperception, which is not dependent upon the nervous system for its presentation. The two treatments are not of a piece, and it is but fair to assume that further development of psychology in the direction of a more consistent presentation, will be of peculiar value within this field of Folkpsychology.

THE PROVINCE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.¹

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There is at present a tendency to agree that there is no social mind and no social psychology apart from individual mind and individual psychology; at the same time individual mind cannot be understood apart from the social environment, and society cannot be understood apart from the operation of individual mind, and there is growing up a social psychology, whose study is individual mental processes in so far as they are conditioned by society and social processes in so far as they are conditioned by states of consciousness. If instead of claiming for social psychology a separate class of phenomena we regard it as an extension of individual psychology to the phenomena of collective life, we have an important set of problems not included in the programs of other sciences.

Among these problems are the following: (1) An examination of the crises or incidents, like famine, pestilence, defeat in battle, dreams, swooning, intoxication, birth, puberty, death, theft, assault, magical practice, etc., which have changed the direction of attention and modified the habits of the group and individual; and the manner in which these crises are connected with the development of morality, religion, custom, myth, invention, and art on the one hand, and with the medicine-man, the priest, lawgiver, judge, physician, artist, philosopher, teacher, and investigator on the other. (2) The influence of the great men in breaking up old habits in the group and establishing new ones. (3) The influence of contact with outsiders in modifying the states of consciousness of a group, and the rate at which a lower race may receive suggestion from a higher without being disorganized. (4) The psychology of social organization, as seen in connection with the maternal system, the

¹ Abstract of a paper read before the Congress of Arts and Science at St. Louis, September 23, 1904.

blood-feud, blood-brotherhood, tribal marks, totemism, initiatory ceremonies, tabu, fetishism, secret societies, crime and punishment, etc. (5) The degree to which the parallelism in development found between all races argues a mental life of the same general ground pattern. (6) A comparison of memory, sense-perception, power of attention, inhibition, abstraction, logical faculty, and temperament in different races, classes and epochs, with a view to determining what differences exist, and to what degree they are innate on the one hand, or due to the habitual direction of the attention and consequent practice on the other. (7) The influence of temperament as compared with cognition in determining the directions of the attention among different races, classes and sexes, and in furnishing the stimulations promoting social change. (8) A comparison of the educational systems of the lower and higher stages of culture, with reference to determining the extent to which the consciousness of a group and the group peculiarities on the mental side are organic, and to what extent they are bound up with the nature of knowledge and tradition transmitted. (9) Have there been epochs of culture in the white race characterized by stages of mental development, and does the child pass in a recapitulatory way through stages of mental development corresponding with these culture-epochs, or does the child recapitulate the brain of the race only in the sense that the accumulated knowledge and standpoint of the race are so presented to him, and with such urgency and system, that habits are broken up and reformed rapidly, and the mind is transformed in no biological sense, but only in the sense that the attention and the content of the mind are made correspondent with the world as it is at present?

Social psychology must coöperate with psychology and anthropology in settling these and similar questions, and in determining the principles underlying mental growth in the race and in the individual before the science of education can make any sure progress, and before the eastern question, the negro question and questions of crime and social reform can be safely approached.

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Die Gesellschaft. ERNST VICTOR ZENKER. I. Bd., *Natürliche Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gesellschaft*, 1899. II. Bd., *Die sociologische Theorie*, 1903. Berlin, G. Reimer. M. 8. Pp. 232, 134.

A sane and well-constructed work, aiming rather to give what may fairly be called the results of sociological investigation than to advance original theories. The first volume considers, in its two parts, social and political evolution respectively. In tracing the progress from the 'primitive horde' emphasis is laid upon the division by ages as the first which would naturally arise. Military and industrial necessities, as well as sex affinities, would favor such a division, and the distinction found in many languages between older and younger brothers and sisters, as well as certain facts in the marriage systems of the Australians, may be the survivals of this.

In the further development of clan and family organization it is held that the family in the proper sense did not grow out of the primitive sex-relations which obtained in the clan and where kinship through the mother was the rule; it had an independent origin from the possession of the woman by the man, whether by capture or by purchase. This has an important psychological implication. For the question suggested here as to the relative priority of feelings and habits is one that may be raised in many connections. Was the family with its growing fidelity due to conjugal affection, or conversely was conjugal affection the product of a family life instituted from other springs? I have elsewhere maintained that in the case of the æsthetic feelings, the feeling is rather the effect than the cause of artistic activity. Zenker maintains a similar position concerning family affection. "No more with men than with animals was it love for wife and child which led man to maintain a lasting house-community; the fact is rather that the family was nothing but a labor community on a basis of personal lordship, and that its first recognized purpose was to procure children." The pastoral life was especially favorable for it. The first effect was unfavorable for the status of woman. The victory of the patriarchate and the family "was a victory of force and power over the original equality, of the man over the woman. * * *

But here, as always in human life, barbarity generated the tenderest feelings. * * * While in the earlier stages of evolution the relation between man and wife had been as a rule loose, and easily separable, whereas in the absence of power over the children by the man and in the consequent absence of interest for them, no education with the essential authority had been possible. With the establishment of the patriarchal family the union of man and wife became more lasting, the interest of the father for his posterity was awakened, even though under brutal influences and in forms revolting to us; and it was these advantages which won the final victory for the father-family in the struggle against the maternal system" (I., 112-124). The author probably does not give sufficient weight to the material and arguments of Westermarck, nor does he indicate exactly how much of the change in sentiment is to be ascribed to physical and how much to social heredity. But the problem suggested is, in my judgment, one of the most interesting in social psychology. This, as indicated, is the problem of the relation of the various sentiments and emotions to the habits—or, speaking from the social standpoint, to the customs and institutions—with which they are connected. Mr. Irving King, in a paper not yet published, has begun such an investigation of the religious sentiments.

Another psychological question raised in any sketch of the evolution of society is that of the ultimate social force or forces. Is it, or are they, material or psychical; and if psychical, then are they intellectual, or affective, or impulsive? An aspect of the question emerges when we consider how far any institution is due to its supposed utility, and how far to a more unconscious and spontaneous activity. Zenker's attitude here is singularly free from the fallacy of supposing that the utility which can be perceived by the student of to-day was present in the minds of the originators. In general the author makes the impulses the fundamental fact. "Society rests on instincts which determine man to society, and which have been partly transmitted from a human time, and partly acquired and then handed down in human society. The movements of the social mass take place instinctively and not from a voluntarily sought consensus, and rational arguments (II., 71)." The primary social instincts are love to one's kind (*Gleichenliebe*), sympathy, and the imitative impulse. The first-named is distinguished by the author from Gidding's 'consciousness of kind.' "For in the word 'consciousness' there is a certain danger of regarding the impulse in question as the result of cognition. In the word *Gleichenliebe* is implied only that 'like seeks like'" (II., 58). The

author's own position on this point, however, seems to have undergone a development, for in his first volume he speaks of the 'consciousness of the likeness of kind' (*Bewusstsein der Artgleichheit*). He points out that normal sex relations occur only between members of the same species. Similar physical constitutions combined with the same environment give rise to similar reactions in sensations, feelings, judgments. Conscious sympathy is the joint product of local ties plus objective likeness; *i. e.*, if the 'nearest' are the 'like,' and if from earliest infancy one lives only in the environment of his like, a degree of sympathy will be formed which will 'flash up into a consciousness of sympathy.' This develops simultaneously with a consciousness of antipathy toward other groups or individuals who are 'different,' or 'strange.' In the second volume more explicit emphasis is placed on what I should regard as the more important psychological factor, *viz.*, habitual association. The group of children growing up about a mother have their senses habituated to a special kind of sensations and experience these as normal, while every deviation appears striking, disturbing, disagreeable. Other color, other hair, other speech — these form too great a barrier to intercourse. In the second volume there is also a distinction made between the *Gleichenliebe* and sympathy. The latter, grounded in the physiological process by which an idea of another's pain may become an actual pain-sensation, is not limited to members of the same species, although it is naturally stronger where the physiological conditions are alike.

The foregoing account of the undoubted fact that 'like seeks like' seems good so far as it goes. Namely, the sex-relation and the processes of birth and nutrition give an environment of 'kind' which then acts by the common law of familiarity. The effect is not produced through an intellectual comparison, and a subsequent recognition of likeness, but is impulsive. There are, however, certain biological and certain psychological factors in addition to those named, which I think should be included. Among the former there is a possibility at least of a genuine instinct, selected naturally as advantageous to the species. Such instinctive tendencies to keep with the herd would certainly be of advantage among gregarious animals. Connected with this may also be a certain instinctive reaction of the sense-organs, particularly smell. As the odor emanating from the female in the rutting period has its peculiar stimulus for the male of the species, so it may well be that a certain part of the attractiveness of the species for the sense of smell and touch may be instinctive, and not the result of familiarity. The psychological factor which is not brought out in

the foregoing, is the more distinctly volitional solidarity brought about by common labor or action toward common ends, both military and industrial.

If these factors are included with those named by Zenker, we should have a scheme something as follows : Man's 'Social Nature' consists of :

A. An instinctive part, transmitted by physical heredity, including (a) tendencies to seek the kind, (b) the physiological basis for 'organic sympathy,' (c) the physiological basis for ideomotor action or suggestibility, which may or may not work out along lines of 'imitation.'

B. A psychological part, which may be further subdivided into (a) a relatively impulsive, irrational, or at least non-rational, emotional attitude or habit; and (b) a relatively conscious, voluntary attitude, determined more by rational reflection. (a) would include the effects of environment both physical and social upon the young, having as subdivisions the effects of association and suggestion respectively. It would also include certain of the effects of common labor, defense and offense, while other constituents of the effects of these activities would fall under (b).

The function of the rational is very briefly treated by Zenker (II., 72-80). In opposition to those who regard the social process as mechanical, and those who regard it as solely the realization of a definite end or purpose, it is maintained that the process from the beginning has its conscious factors, which manifest themselves early in language and the making of tools, and that progress is possible only through ideas. On the other hand, there may be society with no conscious purpose.

Under 'Social Forces' are considered the opposing views of the school which attributes all to environment, and the school which attributes all to race. The author denies that race is a sufficiently objective fact to be considered as a social force. What is effective in race reduces itself to the social impulses and the inherited dispositions which find their place as integrant but not as exclusive factors in social development. The factors which influence the evolution of societies may be classed under three groups; A. Productive forces, or the environment in the broadest sense. B. Social impulses. C. Ideas. But only B can be called in the strict sense 'social forces.' A are outside of the social, C are rather of individual character [this last statement certainly needs further analysis]. A and C act on society or on each other only through the medium of B.

J. H. TUFTS.

The Theory of Business Enterprise. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, Assistant Professor of Political Economy in the University of Chicago. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1904. Pp. vii + 400.

Those who read and enjoyed Professor Veblen's extremely acute, subtle and brilliant *Theory of the Leisure Class* will bring a keen appetite to the analysis of current business processes and psychology which is given in the present volume. Nor will they be disappointed. There is the same cool, scientific dissection of current processes, standards and ideals, which, by its very attitude of unimpassioned, relentless laying bare of sources and springs of action, is more effective than the most passionate sarcasm or invective. There is the same ability to coin a phrase, or use a word in a new application, which shall carry a whole chapter within itself, and become, in the reader's mind, a perpetual challenge to a principle, institution or whole series of conventions. There is the same combination of wealth of concrete material with psychological analysis and philosophical method; the same exploration of economic, social and cultural fields with a given principle. Finally, there is, I venture to think, a similar tendency to simplify the complex springs of human action more than is warranted by an impartial interpretation of the facts. The former volume has not as yet received the attention from psychologists which it deserves, and the title of the present volume would not suggest the large amount of social psychology which it contains. This psychology appears first in the account of business itself, its aims, its assumptions, its prosperity or depression; secondly, in the account of the industrial processes; and thirdly, in tracing the respective influence of these two forms of occupation upon the minds of those who follow them, and upon the broader cultural spheres, economic, political, educational, domestic and religious.

The psychological aspect of the book is not limited to details. It is shown in the effort to state business processes in the terms and shapes in which they are actually conceived by business men. Money, for example, is not for modern business the 'medium of exchange,' as is usually held by those who speak of business traffic 'as a means of obtaining goods suitable for consumption, the end of all purchase and sale being consumable goods, not money values. This latter "may be true in some profound philosophical sense, looking at the process of economic life as a whole, and taking it in its rationalized bearing as a collective endeavor to purvey goods and services for the needs of collective humanity. Such is the view of this matter given by the rationalistic, normalizing speculations of the eighteenth-century

philosophers; and such is, in substance, the view spoken for, in substance, by those economists who still consistently remain at the standpoint of the eighteenth century. The contention need neither be defended nor refuted here, since it does not seriously touch the facts of modern business. Within the range of business transactions this ulterior end does not necessarily come into view, at least not as a motive that guides the transactions from day to day. The matter is not so conceived in business transactions, it does not so appear on the face of the negotiable instruments, it is not by this manner that the money unit enters into the ruling habits of thought of business men" (p. 83).

Again, in current economic theory the business man himself is spoken of as an 'entrepreneur,' and "his function is held to be the coördinating of industrial processes with a view to economics of production and heightened serviceability. The soundness of this view need not be questioned. It has a great sentimental value, and is useful in many ways." Business men, especially the less successful, are to some extent influenced by ideals of serviceability or instincts for workmanship; 'excessive sensitiveness' may interfere with certain kinds of business; the business strategist may be so infected with human infirmity as not to exact the last concession from his rivals which a ruthless business strategy might entitle him to; but 'the motive of business is pecuniary gain,' motives of this kind (serviceability, workmanship) detract from business efficiency, and the captains of the first class are relatively exempt from these unbusiness-like scruples (pp. 41-43).

One of the most interesting phases of the part assigned by the author to psychological processes in business is found in Chapter VII. in the explanation proposed for the periods of business depression. Current theories usually explain these in terms of the producing or consuming process. But as, under present conditions, it is business which directs industry and not *vice versa*, the cause for depression should be sought in business itself. This cause is found by the author in the constantly progressive efficiency of the industrial process which necessarily tends to cheaper productions and lower prices. Now the business man regards money as a stable unit, and hence a constant lowering of prices, with the attendant re-rating and reduction of his capital, appears to him as a loss in value, an impoverishment, even if it carries no reduced command over material goods. A business man's rating and consequently his self-respect is based rather on the pecuniary magnitude of his holdings than on the mechanical service-

ability of his establishment or his output. "The explanation here offered of depression makes it a malady of the affections. The discrepancy which discourages business men is a discrepancy between that nominal capitalization which they have set their hearts upon through habituation in the immediate past and that actual capitalizable value of their property which its current earning capacity will warrant. But where the preconceptions of the business men engaged have, as commonly happen, in great part been fixed and legalized in the form of interest-bearing securities, this malady of the affections becomes extremely difficult to remedy, even though it be true that these legalized affections, preconceptions, or what not, center upon the metaphysical stability of the money unit."

Similar psychological rendering is given to ethical and legal conceptions. 'Principles' are defined as 'habits of thought' and 'business' principles accordingly mean habits of thought suitable to the work of business traffic, corollaries under the main principle of ownership. This principle of ownership or property is a 'habit of thought,' recent as compared with some; 'those who are inclined to give it a more substantial character than that of a habit' are characterized as 'those who still adhere to the doctrine of natural rights with something of the eighteenth century naïveté' (Ch. IV.). Parenthetically it may be observed that Professor Veblen never suggests that there can possibly be any other (*e. g.*, social welfare) basis for the 'right' of property, and it must be admitted that his exhibition of the almost absolute lack of any relation between the pecuniary returns of the more highly organized and successful business operations on the one hand, and any serviceability to the public on the other, would seem to offer small ground for such a basis of rights as applied to these particular fortunes, although the utility of admitting the institution would not necessarily be disproved thereby. So 'snobbery' in psychological terms is 'used without disrespect to denote the element of strain involved, in the quest of gentility on the part of persons whose accustomed social standing is less high or less authentic than their aspirations.'

Coming to the direct doctrine of the book, we have, as already suggested, analyses of the business, and of the industrial or machine process, and a statement of their respective tendencies of influence. Business is the director of the machine process, and the two have radically different effects upon those engaged in them. The machine process with its standardization of goods, tools, work and units of every sort makes the mechanic 'do his work as a factor in a mechanical process whose movement controls his motions.' "The machine is not

his to do with as his fancy may suggest. His place is to take thought of the machine and its work in terms given him by the process that is going forward." "If he fails of the precise measure by more or less, the exigencies of the process check the aberration and drive home the absolute need of conformity. There results a standardization of the workman's intellectual life in terms of mechanical process." "But mechanical efficiency is a matter of precisely adjusted cause and effect. The discipline of the machine inculcates therefore a tendency to think in these terms and these only. As the machine is impersonal, immoral, and knows no ethical or spiritual principles, its tendency is to train those whom it controls into insensibility toward all such concepts. Hence the tendency of the artisans in the distinctly machine occupations to adopt socialism with its ignoring of the conventions of property, family (here the headship of the male, now exhibited chiefly in his 'pecuniary discretion' over the family funds, is 'in jeopardy'), religion, and politics.

Business, on the other hand, as it is concerned with the institution (habit of thought) of ownership or property has a conventional basis. The logic of pecuniary thinking is a working out of the implications of this postulate of ownership. The argument is an argument *de jure*, not *de facto*. [But does not this apply rather to the legal justifications of business, than to the actual processes of discovering means for attaining wealth?] The spiritual attitude given by this training in reasoning *de jure*, is necessarily conservative. The reasoning assumes the validity of the conventionally established postulates. Business classes, therefore, like those engaged in occupations where the thinking moves on a plane of still older conventions — soldiers, politicians, the clergy, and men of fashion — are conservative.

We have, therefore, the following interesting problem: the whole industrial system, on the manipulation of which business depends for its continued existence, fosters a habit of mind which tends to destroy the fundamental postulate of business, viz., the conventions of which property is chief. Business cannot do without the machine process; but neither could survive in company with this process if the full logical results of the process should work out.

A typical expression of this antithesis is found in the legal conflicts between workmen and employers. Decisions of the higher courts more uniformly favor the employers than do the verdicts of jurors. The higher courts decide more strictly in accord with the law, which in turn embodies the common sense of the past, in this case, of the eighteenth century; 'whereas the sympathies of the vul-

gar, as they appear in jury decisions, are largely the outcome of those modern experiences that are at increasing variance with the foundations of the common law' (p. 281).

Trade-unionism is a sort of half-way house in certain respects. It is at variance with the natural-rights foundation of the common law. It 'denies individual freedom of contract to the workman, as well as free discretion to the employer to carry on his business as may suit his own ends'; on the other hand, it does not usually oppose overtly the institution of property. Nevertheless, as the workmen's exigencies are entirely extra-legal (since the law does not recognize any such facts as a standard of livelihood or comfort), so 'the revision of the scheme aimed at by trade-union action runs, not in terms of natural liberty, individual property rights, individual discretion, but in terms of standardized livelihood and mechanical necessity; it is formulated, not in terms of business expediency, but in terms of industrial technological standard units and standard relations.'

The query arises in connection with the above, as to whether the attitude of socialism, or the less extreme position of trade-unionism, is so solely mechanical and matter-of-fact. Is there not a certain demand for fairness, and at the same time a consideration of the general welfare? Is there not a feeling of solidarity, fostered by the organization of machine industry, which is as truly a factor in the workman's attitude as is the materialism induced by the technique of the machine process? The unions, at least, have shown no lack of 'ideals,' although it may be granted that their ideals are not those of 'natural rights.' Indeed, what is the higher standard of livelihood, comfort and intelligence which the unions seek but idealism? The machine is doubtless opposed to conventions and aristocracies, but by increasing the social interaction through the massing of skilled workmen it sets up a new social force which is as favorable to democratic and social ideals as the older isolation (still continued in rural occupations) was to individualism. The psychologist who was looking for analogies might in truth find them in plenty between the unions and the primitive kinship or patriotic groups. There is a similar 'loyalty,' a similar regard for rights of fellow-members and disregard of claims of outsiders, a similar justification of force.

While the insufficient attention given to the social forces leaves a sense of undue simplicity and abstractness in the book viewed as a complete psychology of the business and industrial process, it must be regarded as a highly important contribution to social psychology. The theory of business enterprise is getting before the general public in

various interesting forms, but to the scientifically inclined none of them can compare in interest with Professor Veblen's analysis.

J. H. T.

Ethik als Kulturphilosophie. PAUL BERGEMANN. Leipzig, Hofmann, 1904. Pp. 639.

Chapter I. is the part of this work which is of interest here, as it deals with the evolution of ethical facts. The first section of the chapter treats the primitive conditions of early society, the 'matriarchate' [an unfortunate term; it is generally recognized to-day that while kinship was in early times reckoned through the mother, the power was always in the hands of the men of the clan], and the rise and differentiation of morality in relation to law and custom. Section 2 treats the development of ethical facts in patriarchal society.

The author recognizes frankly the differences in detail which exist in ethical judgments and announces that he proposes to examine German ethics only. He nevertheless draws largely on the studies of other races for the supposed prehistoric German Society. His method is on the one hand to start with certain virtues (*e. g.*, courage, hospitality and sex-purity, mentioned by Tacitus) and to seek the causes for their emergence; and on the other hand to reason deductively from the conditions of clan and of patriarchal society what virtues might be expected to be generated. The difficulty which confronts the ethical student is that there are still many points as to primitive society which are not sufficiently settled to admit of such use as the author makes. This is notably true of the sex and family relations. We are on firmer ground when we consider the effects of primitive solidarity on sympathetic behavior and feelings. Work, warfare, and political conditions are also causes of special virtues which are well outlined. The cause of the differentiation of law from custom was primarily the regulation of possession. The clear separation of law with its sphere of customs especially condemned was a step toward the differentiation of the ethical, which is in essence a separation of the more internal from the more external.

The patriarchal society had of course an especially strong effect on sex and family virtues. The good effects are obvious and often dwelt upon. The evil effects are given by Bergemann a fuller statement than is usual. Not only the extreme results of the subjection of women, as found in polygamy, concubinage, and similar degrading relations, but the virtues most highly esteemed even in modern society show the effect of the patriarchal regime. The sphere of woman's excellence is still regarded as determined by what may be called

'Hörigkeit.' Her virtues as celebrated by poets are those of one who 'belongs,' or of an 'adherent.' Her legal rights are in many respects on the same basis. The new virtues of rulers which result in the patriarchal time prove to be the cardinal virtues of Plato.

J. H. T.

Philosophie des Sciences Sociales. I. Objet des Sciences Sociales.

RENÉ WORMS. Paris, Giard & Brière. 1903. Pp. 230.

The present volume contains little psychological material, as it is largely occupied with general questions of method and aim. The purpose of the book is to give as objective a statement as possible to the positions thus far gained. Part II. on the content, life and evolution of society has some points of interest to the psychologist. The essence of social facts is held to be, not imitation as with Tarde nor constraint as with Durkheim and Coste, but mutual understanding and coöperating or concurrent action (*concours, entente*), the mutual interaction of several thoughts or several activities. For although both imitation and constraint play a part, neither covers all social phenomena. Similarly in discussing the correlation of social facts, the theories which ascribe exclusive dominance to economic conditions on the one hand or to intellectual attitudes on the other are rejected as applying to but a part of the fact. Instead the author inclines to the view that the distinctions — physical, economic, moral, intellectual and the like — are but subjective. The real facts can not be exhaustively comprised under any one of these categories, but rather have all these various aspects. This seems to be in accord with present psychological tendencies.

J. H. T.

The Essential Kaffir. DUDLEY KIDD. New York, The Macmillan Co. 1904. Pp. 435.

This is a book not primarily designed for the scientist. The author has mingled his own observations with accounts taken from other sources in such a way that it is seldom possible to know what the evidence is for a particular statement. The illustrations, however, which number one hundred, are from photographs by the author, and form a very valuable feature of the book.

An interesting point for social psychology is the relation of magic to society. There are 'witches' who are regarded as criminals, and there are 'witch doctors' who are regarded as useful and indispensable members of the tribe. The difference lies in the use for which the magic is used. The chief or diviner may use magic to counteract the magic used against his tribe or some member of it; or "duly recog-

nized persons are allowed to improve the crops or the weather, or to drive off locusts and birds and other pests by magical practices. It is thus seen to be legitimate to use magic for the benefit of the tribe or for common interests; it is wicked to use it for private or personal ends. Only chiefs or duly initiated diviners have any right to use magical practices; any of the common people supposed to have made use of magic run a tremendous risk of being put to death, for they are not doctors, but sorcerers." The 'authorized' diviners claim to be in touch with the ancestral spirits. Whether the witches regard themselves — or are regarded — as having to do with a special set of spirits, or whether they rely wholly on the principles of sympathetic magic, is not stated. In any case, some interesting comparisons are suggested with the attitude toward magic among the early Hebrews. With them, as with the Kaffirs, there was a sort of divination used by the priests or rulers which was authorized; it was regarded as a method of learning the will of the national god. On the other hand, 'witchcraft' had as one of its forms consulting the dead. Ancestral spirits had come under the ban. Among the Malays certain spirits were regarded as belonging to the sphere of magic.

An interesting feature of the Kaffir is the peculiarly strong development of his 'social self' (in James' use of the term). All chiefs keep a Court Praiser whose business it is to go in front of the chief and sing his praises. After a man has died it is as important to praise him as to supply food. To praise such an ancestral spirit is to call over his 'praise-names.' "The Kaffirs seems to think that ancestral spirits slowly vanish, much like the Snark. As soon as people forget the great things they did and their praise-giving names they practically cease to exist. Their life after death is vaguely dependent on the memory of the living." * * * "The moment a man's praise-giving titles are forgotten it becomes impossible to worship him in any full sense, for wherewith shall the people praise him?" The converse consequences are also drawn by the people. If the sacrifice of the ox with the accompanying praise does not obtain favorable results the people say, "When have we ceased to kill cattle for you and when have we ever refused to praise you by your praise-names? Why, then, do you treat us so shabbily? If you do not behave better we shall utterly forget your names, and then what will you do when there is no one to praise you? * * * We shall utterly disown you. We shall tell the people that as for us we have no ancestral spirits, and this will be to your shame." But such a dreadful penalty as this works both ways. As the Hebrew felt humiliated that any could say

"Where is now their god?" so the Kaffir finds his own self shrivel in the thought that no ancestral spirits heed his prayers. "As for us, we have no Amatongo, and we may as well perish." The social factor in religion, so forcibly presented by Robertson Smith, is evidently the most prominent object of the Kaffir religion.

The treatment accorded marriage and the sex-relations is very discreet. The author seems more concerned to prove that the Kaffir sex-morality is mostly what a European would call immorality, than to point out scientifically just what aspects of sex-relations are controlled by custom or by the group, and what are left to individual caprice or passion. Polygamy, concubinage, promiscuous relations at certain specific seasons, doubtless belong to a lower grade of morality than European theory authorizes, but if the emotional and intentional aspects are more important for the total situation than the mere physical facts it is necessary to be wary of reading into the situation the emotional and intentional attitudes of a more developed stage. If these were present the situation might well be intolerable; but if, on the contrary, religious and patriotic sanctions attend a general line of conduct they certainly transform the physiological facts. The early Hebrew documents afford numerous illustrations of acts which for us are very difficult psychologically. There are evidences, scattered through Mr. Kidd's book, of social control, *e. g.*, the *hlonipa* or restrictions upon seeing or talking with the relatives by marriage; the restrictions upon marriage between relatives, or those bearing the same name; the regulations as to divorce and the cattle-payment; but they are not massed so as to bring out the psychology of the relation. In discussing the merits of cattle-marriage, however, the author points out how the custom of buying the wife enhances the value of woman, not only in the eyes of her father who receives and of the husband who gives the cattle, but also in the eyes of the woman herself. To be worth a great herd of cattle is as much an evidence of dignity and esteem as for an American heiress to marry a title. "The women would view with alarm any proposal to abolish the plan (of purchasing wives by cattle), and they pour scorn and contempt on a woman who has not been duly bought by cattle; they call such women old cats, for the cat is the only animal they consider unworthy of being sold."

The book is written in a very entertaining style and with its fine illustrations certainly gives a vivid picture of the Kaffir.

J. H. T.

The Psychology of Race Prejudice. W. I. THOMAS. American Journal of Sociology, 1903, IX., pp. 593-611.

The basis of race-prejudice is biological. The final step in animal growth from the primitive tropic reception or rejection of stimuli vitally good or bad through the later adaptation of sense-organs for more complex discriminations, is the appearance of judgment (attention memory, and comparison) designed to estimate stimuli by reference to past cases, and of emotions, which are the felt organic changes accompanying the choice or rejection of agreeable or disagreeable stimuli, and which reinforce action following decision. Where there arise fixed recurrent situations with fixed stimuli, good or bad, fixed correspondent mental attitudes, or instincts, develop, as predilection and prejudice; and by force of suggestion characteristic signs of the object, as a voice, odor, or color, may come to evolve the same reaction as the object itself. 'Unaccommodated man' is hostile and suspicious by reason of his predacious struggle for food. His alliance, however, with wife, children, blood-brother, domestic animals, clan, tribe, and nation makes part of his environment part of his intimate 'self.' A tribal 'self' of predilections grows up opposed to the 'not-self' or outside world of prejudices, with an instinctive organic sense of tribal solidarity essential to group preservation, localized in predilection or prejudice towards characteristic aspects or signs. In this growth several factors emerge. Prenatal organic association of mother and offspring in mammalian intra-uterine reproduction, social association during lactation and a long infancy essential to a complex type, develop intense maternal interest as the subjective condition necessary to insure the care of the immature child. The male is infected with this interest indirectly through association with and regard for the mother. The bias toward the child extends and attaches peculiar value to the characteristic marks of its personality, features, toys, dress, etc., and attention and memory become obsessed by them to the exclusion or disparagement of contrasted ones. In courtship, the peculiarities of one sex excite peculiar organic responses in the other. Characteristic traits or behavior, conspicuous or well displayed, win recognition and triumph as marks of maleness or of femaleness, are biologically selected, and are singled out for emphasis and made to carry a whole fund of sex suggestion. Witness fashion in dress and cosmetics, as the use of fat and charcoal by negresses, of rice-powder by whites, of lacing, bustles, etc. And the prevailing tribal type-characteristics are chosen for admiration, as fatness in women by the Hottentot, slenderness by the Egyptian, while opposed characteristics

of other tribes are disparaged. Again, in coöperative alliance for hunting and defence, attention is fixed on characteristic natural or artificial signs, and, through usage, attaches emotional values to them, as in scarification, tatooing, mutilation, totemic marks, flags, the rite of blood brotherhood — concrete sensuous symbols aiding an unpracticed power of abstraction and representing the group's associational part. In the opposition of 'self' and 'not-self' in the feud, any mark of either group in dress, features, speech, grows hateful to the other. Finally, it is normal to feel easy, neutral, relaxed in the presence of the usual; but anything unknown or strange becomes sinister and hostile by reason of its disturbing set habit and provoking strained attention and high excitement. By the law of interest, then, the tribe fixes on external signs of unlikeness in another group, features, dress, speech, 'scanty beard,' 'hirsuteness,' color, shape of forehead, nose, or eye, height, or facial line, exaggerates them, and holds them up to scorn, while, on the other hand, it makes more prominent and admirable its own characteristic traits, as the breeder does with animals in breeding and the female with herself in fashions. In connection with these signs are seen the concrete expressions of prejudice, as numerous examples bear out.

Race-prejudice is, accordingly, superficial, attached to external aspects of strange people. But, originating before deliberative thought, instinctive, immediate, persistent, it is not open to conscious or legal control. Nevertheless, by association or a slight change of stimulus, like fashions, it is easily dissipated or converted to its opposite. Witness Livingstone's and Stanley's temporary preference of the dark skin and the negro's lofty 'whiteness' toward his African brother. The northerner feels true prejudice toward the unfamiliar skin. The southerner by long association with blacks, from the cradle even, has lost skin — or race-prejudice proper, but caste-feeling, contempt of the higher group for the inferior, has reinforced marks of superiority and inferiority, whiteness and blackness, as aids in manipulating the lower by its suggestive effect on each, and here prejudice is more ineradicable. But race-prejudice will never disappear as long as mankind is diverse. Instinctive, unreasonable, not open to legislation, it will slowly diminish with increased intercommunication, common interests and standards, similar education, equal access to knowledge, mental and social parity. Races will come to stand to each other as specialized occupations in business or science do to-day, where the individual's ability to get results gives him a status independent of, quite overshadowing indeed, the superficial marks of personality.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

MILTON SILLS.

The Sociology of Conflict. GEORG SIMMEL. Translated by A. W. Small. American Journal of Sociology, IX., 490-525, 672-689.

Conflict is a positive factor in socialization, not merely a disintegrating factor. It is coördinate with unity and harmony. Indeed, each of these two kinds of factors, the conflicting or diverging factors, and the unifying or converging factors; the struggle principle and the unifying principle, arrives at its complete sociological significance only in coöperation with the other. Every actual unification in society contains, along with factors which make for harmony between the elements, others which primarily make against harmony. Social unity or organization is the result of both categories of reactions.

Various illustrations of this thesis are given. An individual achieves the unity of his personality not in such fashion that its contents invariably harmonize according to logical or material, religious or ethical standards, but rather as contradiction and strife not merely precede that unity, but are operative in it at every moment of life. Further, if we had not the power and right to oppose tyranny and obstinacy, we couldn't endure relations with people who betray such characteristics. Opposition affords us a subjective satisfaction, without which the relationship, *i. e.*, the social structure, would break down. Without this aversion and incipient opposition, life in a great city would have no thinkable form.

These hostile relationships do not of themselves produce a social structure, but only in correlation with unifying energies. Whenever an historical unification and organization has come about, the process has contained various distinguishable forms of relationship, each one of which sociology isolates and abstracts from the manifoldness of actual existence. It is the nature of the human mind not to be bound to other minds by a single thread.

The whole phenomenon of hostility may be in part accounted for by a certain formal impulse of hostility — an instinct of antipathy. This appears in that natural enmity between man and man, in the pleasure in the misfortune of others, the spirit of contradiction, the ease with which hostility can be suggested. Hostility is thus a primary impulse of the subject, which of itself seeks an adequate object; not a mere reaction in the subject, caused by the presence of a stimulus. Of course, for the total phenomenon of hostility, not only this impulse is needed, but also appropriate objects.

In order that conflict may be most intense, there must be present some unifying elements. This is shown in various cases. In the war

game there must be agreement to struggle, and the struggle occurs under reciprocal recognition of norms and rules. Likewise in legal struggles. Where both parties pursue one and the same object, as truth in scientific controversies, the struggle becomes more intense. The consciousness of being the representative of superindividual claims lends to the struggle a radicalness. This is further shown in the social struggles since Marx, which have centered more and more around the objective organization of the productive system, and less and less around mere personal embitterments. Thus, in these cases, the struggle is intensified because it is carried on under reciprocally recognized norms, or because it relates to objective interests recognized on both sides as superindividual — in other words, because the conflict factors are united in some degree with unifying factors.

The same thing is also true in a more marked way, where there is a previous community between the parties to the conflict. There are two types of previous community. (1) Community of Qualities, where the law is that an enmity must excite consciousness the more deeply and energetically, the greater the similarity between the parties among whom it originates. Under this head come family quarrels, etc. The deepest hatred grows out of terminated love. The most deeply rooted friendships may come easier to a conflict, because each party is confident that no shock could shatter the relationship; while a friendship rooted in inferior depths of feeling may run a course much more harmonious. Again, the hatred of apostates and heretics illustrates this law. Indeed, that a difference of convictions should run into hatred and struggle, occurs as a rule only in case of essential and original equality of the parties. (2) Community through subsumption under one and the same social interdependence. When conflict takes place after such an interdependence, a new motive appears, social hatred, *i. e.*, hatred toward a member of a group, not from personal motives, but because he threatens the existence of the group.

Finally, jealousy shows us the case where the erection of antagonism above unity reaches its most radical form. For, in jealousy, the subject feels that he has a claim to a person, or to some relationship with a person, which is unjustly withheld from him by a third person. And the tension of antagonism between the jealous person, and the person on whose account the jealousy is aroused toward a third person, becomes the stronger, the more unlimited the unity is from which it proceeds, and the more passionately its conquest is sought.

Parallel with these influences which struggle exercises on the

relations of the parties to each other, is the influence which it exercises on the inner structure of each party. There must be inner alterations and adaptations demanded by the exigencies of the conflict — concentration, and pulling oneself together. Only when each party is unified, can the struggle be carried to a decisive issue. Groups which find themselves in any sort of war are not tolerant of any departures from the unity which binds the group together. This is illustrated by the severity with which women condemn any violation of morality by members of their own sex, because morality is their chief means of defence against the encroachments and excesses of the opposite sex, and any slight relaxation of morality would endanger the whole structure. Thus, struggle has a solidifying effect within the whole group.

G. P. ADAMS.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

BOOKS RECEIVED FROM SEPTEMBER 7 TO OCTOBER 7.

The Principles of Knowledge. J. E. WALTER. 2 vols. West Newton (Pa.), 1900 and 1904. Pp. 302 and 331. \$4.

The Ainu Group at the St. Louis Exposition. F. STARR. Chicago, Open Court Co., 1904. Pp. 118.

Ants and some Other Insects. A. FOREL. (Transl. by W. M. WHEELER.) Chicago, Open Court Co., 1904. Pp. 50. (Brochure.)

[English version of 'Inquiry into the Psychic Powers of these Animals, with Appendix on the Peculiarities of their Olfactory Sense.']

Proceedings of the Second Convention of the Religious Education Association, Philadelphia, 1904. Chicago, The Association, 1904. Pp. xiii + 640.

Du rôle de l'individu dans le déterminisme social. D. DRAGHICESCO. Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. 368. Fr. 7.50.

Science and Immortality. W. OSLER. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1904. Pp. 54. [Ingersoll Lecture.]

L'Année Philosophique. F. PILLON. 14^e Année (1903). Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. 314.

Herbert Spencer. J. ROYCE and J. COLLIER. New York, Fox, Duffield & Co., 1904. Pp. 234. \$1.25 net.

Adolescence, its Psychology, etc. G. STANLEY HALL. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1904. 2 vols. Pp. xx + 591 and 784.

An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements. E. L. THORNDIKE. New York, The Science Press, 1904. Pp. xii.

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE International Congress of Arts and Science met in the World's Fair Grounds at St. Louis, September 19-25, with nearly 1,000 members in attendance. The opening meeting, on the afternoon of September 19, was very largely attended. After the formal opening exercises the introductory address was delivered by the president of the Congress, Simon Newcomb, on 'The Evolution of the Scientific Investigator.'

On September 20 the seven Divisions met in the morning. G. Stanley Hall presided and gave the opening address before the Division on Mental Science, the subject being 'Conditions and Prospects of Psychology.' The twenty-four Departments met later in the same day. George T. Ladd presided in the Department of Psychology in the absence of Noah K. Davis. The addresses were, 'Fundamental Conceptions and Methods in Psychology' by J. McK. Cattell, and 'The Progress of Psychology in the Last Century,' by J. Mark Baldwin (read in his absence by R. B. Perry).

The Section meetings occupied the four succeeding days. The following is reported by Wm. Harper Davis, secretary for the department of psychology. The Section on General Psychology met with Josiah Royce in the chair. Addresses were made by Harald Höffding on 'The Relations of General Psychology,' and by James Ward on 'Present Problems in General Psychology.' The general discussion which followed was participated in by W. T. Harris, Mary W. Calkins, A. T. Ormond, and the previous speakers in reply. In the Section on Experimental Psychology Edward A. Pace presided; the speakers were Robert MacDougall on 'The Relations of Experimental Psychology,' and E. B. Titchener on 'Present Problems in Experimental Psychology.' The papers were discussed by A. T. Ormond, the Chairman, and the principal speakers in reply. The Section on Comparative and Genetic Psychology was presided over by Edmund C. Sanford, who gave an introductory address. The speakers were C. Lloyd Morgan on 'The Relations of Comparative and Genetic Psychology,' and Mary W. Calkins on 'Present Problems in Comparative and Genetic Psychology.' Brief papers were then presented

by the late C. L. Herrick (read by C. Judson Herrick) on "The 'Dynamic' or 'Functional' Method in Comparative and Genetic Psychology," John B. Watson on 'The Importance of Combining Neurological with Psychological Methods in Comparative Work,' and Wm. Harper Davis on 'Certain Methodological Considerations Suggested by the Principal Addresses.' The general discussion was participated in by Henry Rutgers Marshall, Harald Höffding, and C. Lloyd Morgan in reply. Edward C. Cowles presided in the Section on Abnormal Psychology, in the absence of M. A. Starr. Pierre Janet spoke on 'Les problèmes actuels de la psychologie pathologique et les oscillations du niveau mentale,' and Morton Prince on 'Some Problems of the Unconscious.' There followed a general discussion by Messrs. Höffding, Marshall, Janet, and the secretary of the meeting, Adolf Meyer. (We are indebted to Dr. Meyer for the report of this Section.)

The entire proceedings of the Congress are to be printed, and should form a valuable contribution to the literature on the present state of scientific research.

WE have received a special number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, under date of May 1904, devoted to the commemoration of the death of Kant. It is a most fitting volume of 340 pages, with contributions from the pens of many of the most distinguished writers of the continent, of which the most psychological are those by Eucken on 'The Soul,' Basch on 'The Imagination,' and Cantoni on 'Space,' in the Kantian system. We congratulate the *Revue* on this fine tribute to the great philosopher.

It is proposed by the Johns Hopkins University Department of Philosophy and Psychology to hold on October 28 an informal commemoration of the anniversary of the death of John Locke. Short addresses will be delivered on various aspects of the work and influence of the philosopher.

It is with very great regret that we record the death, at Socorro, New Mexico, on September 15, of Dr. C. L. Herrick, editor of the *Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology*, and a valued contributor to this REVIEW.

DR. J. W. BAIRD, Ph.D. (Cornell), has been appointed assistant in experimental psychology in the Johns Hopkins University. Professor Stratton has entered upon his duties as professor in the same department in that institution.

DR. H. W. STEWART, of the University of Iowa, is to take the work at Lake Forest University of Professor Walter Smith, who is on leave of absence for the year.

DR. J. E. W. WALLIN, Ph.D (Yale), has been reappointed demonstrator in experimental psychology at Princeton University.

The following items are taken from the press:

MR. LUTHER A. WEIGLE has been appointed instructor in psychology at Yale University.

MR. WILL GRANT CHAMBERS has been called from the chair of psychology and education in State Normal School, at Moorhead, Minn., to the chair of psychology in the State Normal School of Colorado, at Greeley.

THE Second International Congress of Philosophy was opened at the University of Geneva on September 4, with 316 members in attendance.

WE welcome the appearance of the first issue (May, 1904) of the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, already announced in these pages. (Worcester, Mass., Clark Univ. Press, \$3.50 per year).

DR. ADOLF MEYER, of the New York Pathological Institute, has been appointed Professor of Psychiatry in the Cornell Medical School, New York City. He will continue to hold his former position together with the new one.

CONTENTS OF THE MAGAZINES.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XI., 3. The Law of Attraction in Relation to some Visual and Tactual Illusions: *Haywood J. Pearce*. The Relation between the Vaso-Motor Waves and Reaction Times: *William R. Wright*. On the Horopter: *George T. Stevens*. Shorter Contributions. The Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the Real: *C. L. Herrick*. The Period of Conversion: *G. A. Tawney*. The Genetic Progression of Psychic Objects: *J. Mark Baldwin*. Notes. On the Attributes of Attention: *M. W. Calkins*.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, LVII., 5. De la vérité: remarques logiques: *A. Naville*. La perception de la verticalité de la tête et du corps: *B. Bourdon*. La conception générale de l'association des idées et les données de l'expérience: *H. Piéron*. Notes et observations. De la conscience des agonisants: *Vaschide*. Miscellany.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, VII., 3. Dell' odierno concetto della 'Storia della Filosofia': *V. Alemanni*. Nota psicologica intorno al significato dell' Argomento di Sant' Anselmo d' Aosta: *R. Nazzari*. Psicologia della Credenza: *A. Aliotta*. La Dottrina delle due Etiche di H. Spencer (II.): *E. Juvalta*. Nota Estetica: *A. Manzari*. Miscellany.

